Firearms Acquisition By Terrorists In Europe

Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE

Authors: Nils Duquet; Kevin Goris
In this book, the authors provide an overview of the knowledge regarding the purchases of weapons in the EU by terrorists. This is a phenomenon that deserves a lot of attention because it has been shown in the recent past that this is “in our back yard”. After every terrorist act there are a multitude of questions from the population. Not only why this happened, but also how this could happen is regularly asked. This book tries to chart the share of the “arms market for terrorists” in the “how” of these questions.
In the first chapter the authors deal with legislation up to 2017. This discussion of the legislation on arms sales shows that the EU still has a lot of work to coordinate between the countries in order to remove legal loopholes concerning arms transports and arms sales.
In the second chapter, the authors discuss the illegal arms markets in Europe itself. This shows how difficult it is to have an overview of something that seems simple, namely how many illegal weapons are there in Europe? The estimate ranges between 81000 and 67000000. Difficulties in making estimates include closed markets, but also the increase in available military grade weapons on illegal markets. Include illegal production, theft and reactivation of deactivated antique weapons, and you will get an unclear picture.
In the third chapter, the authors discuss the accessibility of the arms markets for terrorists. That appears not to be that simple. The arms markets are a closed market. If you already have criminal offenses on your record, you are known and trusted. Moreover, the arms dealers are not as keen on selling weapons if they know that the aim is to commit a terrorist attack. In addition, it appears that these markets are not a single market. Procurement methods differ depending on whether they are separatists, religious terrorists, right-wing terrorist groups or left-wing terrorist groups.
In the fourth chapter, the authors provide a number of policy recommendations with regard to the countries and the EU. This includes a coherent approach to regulation. But they also provide operational advice, such as exchanging data, uniform data storage, collaborating on data analysis, monitoring the implementation of legislation, applying strict penalties … Collaboration with citizens has not been forgotten, by the possibility of them voluntarily turning in their weapons. In addition, they also have an eye for the capabilities to be built in the nations, international coordination and cooperation. Finally, they indicate the following risks to follow up:

  • The increase in available military-grade weapons,
  • The spread of firearms from legality into illegality,
  • The role of weapon collectors and enthusiasts, and handymen,
  • Arms transactions on the internet,
  • The future of 3D printing.

 

 

risk management, strictly speaking – success factors of support

Author: Manu Steens

An organizational structure , a decree or law, (a) (some) measure (s), … must be supported to succeed. To be supported, they must be recognized. (I have no criterion to say in which cases this model is all relevant, for that a study should be done of successful and failed business in hindsight.)

Recognition in itself, however, is based on four success factors:

  • legitimacy,
  • cohesion of the target group due to proximity with civilians / the employees of the organisation,
  • effectiveness with purpose and perseverance,
  • authority.

These four pillars are interdependent. If you remove one leg from the table, the other legs will come along and the table will fall. So you cannot actually view them as independent. For the sake of the further discussion, I do that here anyway.

One thing that seems to be clearly supported is the EU regulation of the GDPR. Something that does not seem to be supported is the Brexit . Let us therefore illustrate these two things with this idea.

Success factors of support applied to the GDPR.

  • Legitimacy: The GDPR legislation was imposed by the EU and applies to all EU countries for implementation
  • Cohesion of the target group through proximity : The EU countries are interdependent because they are related to the EU, but also because they have free movement of people, which implicates that they can enjoy similar legislation despite traveling in the EU. At the same time, the EU is for the most part a coherent whole, as a result of which the countries are coherent in terms of supporting the legislation. Proximity is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that EU citizens have recognized the legislation as something that concerns them very much. It belonged very quickly to the
  • Effectiveness: A true barnum advertising has been conducted for the GDPR, pointing out that this legislation applies to the citizen. This was so effective that the people of the EU and the organizations are aware of their rights. And in the very short term jobs have been created: eg. lawyers specializing in GDPR but also DPOs, courses, …
  • Authority: There is also a place in the legislation itself for punitive measures in case of non-application of the law by the organizations in the EU. Also, auditing capabilities were provided. Partly as a result of the possible effect of the hammer, many organizations applied the law, and there was a great sense of “doing something about it”.

Conclusion: due to the barnum advertising, this legislation was strongly founded on these four success factors, so that it could actually only succeed.

Success factors of support applied to the Brexit .

  • Legitimacy: It came about through an unclear referendum with a majority “behind the comma”. There is total division within and across the political parties and within the people. The British Prime Minister was therefore completely in a gap of uncertainty. None of the proposals from the EU or the British themselves was accepted by a clear majority.
  • Cohesion: The British are divided. The votes for and against are neatly divided and without clear coherence. Many people, together with their politics, attach great importance to their sovereignty. Others opt for the possibilities that a cohesive Europe together with the British could mean. The connection is lost. The division is down to the granular level of the population.
  • Effectiveness: Due to a great deal of uncertainty, all proposals about the Brexit in a reasonable manner were As a result, it is regularly postponed. As a result of that, it is unclear how, if and when the Brexit will be a fact.
  • Authority : The Brexit could turn out differently from day to day in a new referendum. There is also a difference of opinion between, for example, the Scots and the rest of the British. In addition, the British regularly state the historic words of Churchill that “GB is with the EU but not of the EU”.

Conclusion: The Brexit cannot be called a success .