Managing Outside Pressure – Strategies for Preventing Corporate Disasters

Authors: Matthias Winter; Ulrich Steger

In Chapter 1, the authors offer a historical statement of the Nobel Prize Laureate Economy Friedman from 1962: “In a free society, there is one and only one social responsibility or business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.” With that, organizations became dominant in society. But more and more people believe that today the same organizations are causing much of society’s problems. This creates groups of activists and they start to exert pressure. A number of questions follow from this:

  • What is the stakeholder concept and how can they influence organizations?
  • What is the difference between a “transactional” and a “contextual” environment?
  • How do we evaluate the situation from the point of view of the organization?
  • How do we evaluate the situation from the point of view of the activists?

The authors provide answers to these questions in the course of a number of chapters.

The “Stakeholders” can be an extensive number of groups: consumers, customers, competitors, employees, shareholders, environmental organizations, local communities, local authorities, suppliers, special interest groups, owners, the media, the legislature, scientists and researchers, banks, … they all have an interest somewhere in the results and the operation of the organization.
These can be divided into two groups: the transactional environment and the contextual environment: the first has some professional business relationship with the organization. Normally they can negotiate with the management about the rules for the transaction. The contextual environment has no direct market or business relationships.

There are also activists: these can be loosely classified into environmental activists, health-related activists and socially motivated activists. That way they are mainly in the contextual environment. How can they influence an organization? The authors describe this with “Transmission belts”. The first is direct pressure of protest. A second is the search for associates in the transactional group, for example the customers. This impact can cause the organization a financial hangover. They can also find supporters in the contextual environment, for example with the legislator. They can best use both, since the clients can work flexibly in the short term, while the legislator works more decisively with regulations but more in the long term.

In chapter 3 the authors talk about “Corporate Early Awareness Models”. They state that the traditional model of the stakeholder analysis is outdated. After all, a number of things vary over time: the agendas of the various stakeholders, the importance and influence of different groups, how the organization behaves in the sector, and social values. The new analysis models try to make the difference between early identification versus a late intervention. One advantage on the first is that you can avoid the difficult things so that they are no longer relevant. The second means that you as an organization do not waste time and energy on what is not relevant. In addition, it is good to make a distinction between strong and weak situations. Strong situations are best identified early, while weak situations can usually be dealt with later on. The strong situations run the risk of going through the following stages:

  • “concern”
  • “issue”
  • “crisis”
  • “scandal”

Because it can become a “scandal”, it is necessary to intervene quickly. Weak situations do not usually reach this final stage.

To make a difference between a “strong” and “weak” situation in a systematic way, the tool has been proposed by the authors, from the perspective of the organization. This covers the following eight sections:

  • Are the arguments against the issue plausible?
  • Does the issue cause emotion? Is this understandable – visually and touching – to the public?
  • Is the issue media friendly?
  • Are there links with other issues of the organization or of other involved organizations or within the sector?
  • How strong is the “key” activist group?
  • How isolated is the organization?
  • How far have the dynamics of the crisis already developed?
  • How easy is it to find a solution?

To complete their “world view”, however, the organizations also need a picture of the situation through the eyes of the activists. Which factors make the situation “attractive” for them? And for which type of campaigners? For this, the authors brought the activists into four groups along two axes. First: integrating versus polarizing. Do they integrate the role of the business and the public interest in their own system of objectives or not? Integrators place a high priority on developing a productive win-win relationship with the business, while the polarizers simply push through their minds and do not cooperate with the organizations. The second axis shows whether the action group discriminates between organizations within an industry with regard to a genuine or perceived commitment of the organization to environmental issues, health issues or social issues. “Discriminators” look at the progress of the organizations with regard to benchmarks in their sector. The non-discriminators focus on the problems that the organizations and entire industries cause, without distinction between the good guys and the bad guys. These four groups have their own modus operandi.

  • Sharks arbitrarily attack organizations. They are not very organization-specific in their target and are generally harmless to individual organizations.
  • Sea lions are usually even less dangerous for organizations because they tend to only address weak situations and discussions about social values ​​in general.
  • Dolphins focus more on a single situation and work with the organizations to find a win-win solution.
  • The really dangerous activist groups are the orcas. They isolate the organization and humiliate them in public for their sins. They choose symbolic situations and use a lot of symbolism in their campaigns.

The authors’ research shows that most activist groups, but especially orcas and dolphins, have a collection of guidelines for when to engage in a situation.

When a situation meets the requirements of this or a similar list, the danger of a confrontation increases:

  • The campaign must have a clear goal.
  • The issue must be easily understood by the general public.
  • The issue has a symbolic value.
  • The issue has the potential to damage the image of the organization.
  • The opponent is strong enough (no “underdog” effect).
  • The issue can be packed in a campaign in which the public can be involved.
  • There are solutions that are confrontational, not gradual (political concepts, management concepts, product or process concepts, that are competitive in terms of price and quality).
  • There must be a drama element to the campaign to engage the media.

In chapter six the authors give a number of tips and examples of the application of these checklists. A possible template for a signal description of an upcoming issue includes a place for the following questions:

  • What is the issue?
  • Who is affected? (Internal? External?)
  • Who discovered the situation?
  • When did the signals occur?
  • Where did the signals occur?
  • What are the signals that have occurred?
  • Why can this become an issue that is relevant to the organization?

In Chapter 7, the authors present nine cases of issues that occurred, or were to act potentially in the near future at the time, arguing that the model works.

In chapter eight, the authors indicate that the organization always has the choice between two options:

  • Drop the project / action.
  • Carry out the project / action anyway.

In addition, they provide advice in both cases.

A possible template for these tools can be found in the attachment.

Firearms Acquisition By Terrorists In Europe

Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE

Authors: Nils Duquet; Kevin Goris
In this book, the authors provide an overview of the knowledge regarding the purchases of weapons in the EU by terrorists. This is a phenomenon that deserves a lot of attention because it has been shown in the recent past that this is “in our back yard”. After every terrorist act there are a multitude of questions from the population. Not only why this happened, but also how this could happen is regularly asked. This book tries to chart the share of the “arms market for terrorists” in the “how” of these questions.
In the first chapter the authors deal with legislation up to 2017. This discussion of the legislation on arms sales shows that the EU still has a lot of work to coordinate between the countries in order to remove legal loopholes concerning arms transports and arms sales.
In the second chapter, the authors discuss the illegal arms markets in Europe itself. This shows how difficult it is to have an overview of something that seems simple, namely how many illegal weapons are there in Europe? The estimate ranges between 81000 and 67000000. Difficulties in making estimates include closed markets, but also the increase in available military grade weapons on illegal markets. Include illegal production, theft and reactivation of deactivated antique weapons, and you will get an unclear picture.
In the third chapter, the authors discuss the accessibility of the arms markets for terrorists. That appears not to be that simple. The arms markets are a closed market. If you already have criminal offenses on your record, you are known and trusted. Moreover, the arms dealers are not as keen on selling weapons if they know that the aim is to commit a terrorist attack. In addition, it appears that these markets are not a single market. Procurement methods differ depending on whether they are separatists, religious terrorists, right-wing terrorist groups or left-wing terrorist groups.
In the fourth chapter, the authors provide a number of policy recommendations with regard to the countries and the EU. This includes a coherent approach to regulation. But they also provide operational advice, such as exchanging data, uniform data storage, collaborating on data analysis, monitoring the implementation of legislation, applying strict penalties … Collaboration with citizens has not been forgotten, by the possibility of them voluntarily turning in their weapons. In addition, they also have an eye for the capabilities to be built in the nations, international coordination and cooperation. Finally, they indicate the following risks to follow up:

  • The increase in available military-grade weapons,
  • The spread of firearms from legality into illegality,
  • The role of weapon collectors and enthusiasts, and handymen,
  • Arms transactions on the internet,
  • The future of 3D printing.

 

 

risk management, strictly speaking – success factors of support

Author: Manu Steens

An organizational structure , a decree or law, (a) (some) measure (s), … must be supported to succeed. To be supported, they must be recognized. (I have no criterion to say in which cases this model is all relevant, for that a study should be done of successful and failed business in hindsight.)

Recognition in itself, however, is based on four success factors:

  • legitimacy,
  • cohesion of the target group due to proximity with civilians / the employees of the organisation,
  • effectiveness with purpose and perseverance,
  • authority.

These four pillars are interdependent. If you remove one leg from the table, the other legs will come along and the table will fall. So you cannot actually view them as independent. For the sake of the further discussion, I do that here anyway.

One thing that seems to be clearly supported is the EU regulation of the GDPR. Something that does not seem to be supported is the Brexit . Let us therefore illustrate these two things with this idea.

Success factors of support applied to the GDPR.

  • Legitimacy: The GDPR legislation was imposed by the EU and applies to all EU countries for implementation
  • Cohesion of the target group through proximity : The EU countries are interdependent because they are related to the EU, but also because they have free movement of people, which implicates that they can enjoy similar legislation despite traveling in the EU. At the same time, the EU is for the most part a coherent whole, as a result of which the countries are coherent in terms of supporting the legislation. Proximity is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that EU citizens have recognized the legislation as something that concerns them very much. It belonged very quickly to the
  • Effectiveness: A true barnum advertising has been conducted for the GDPR, pointing out that this legislation applies to the citizen. This was so effective that the people of the EU and the organizations are aware of their rights. And in the very short term jobs have been created: eg. lawyers specializing in GDPR but also DPOs, courses, …
  • Authority: There is also a place in the legislation itself for punitive measures in case of non-application of the law by the organizations in the EU. Also, auditing capabilities were provided. Partly as a result of the possible effect of the hammer, many organizations applied the law, and there was a great sense of “doing something about it”.

Conclusion: due to the barnum advertising, this legislation was strongly founded on these four success factors, so that it could actually only succeed.

Success factors of support applied to the Brexit .

  • Legitimacy: It came about through an unclear referendum with a majority “behind the comma”. There is total division within and across the political parties and within the people. The British Prime Minister was therefore completely in a gap of uncertainty. None of the proposals from the EU or the British themselves was accepted by a clear majority.
  • Cohesion: The British are divided. The votes for and against are neatly divided and without clear coherence. Many people, together with their politics, attach great importance to their sovereignty. Others opt for the possibilities that a cohesive Europe together with the British could mean. The connection is lost. The division is down to the granular level of the population.
  • Effectiveness: Due to a great deal of uncertainty, all proposals about the Brexit in a reasonable manner were As a result, it is regularly postponed. As a result of that, it is unclear how, if and when the Brexit will be a fact.
  • Authority : The Brexit could turn out differently from day to day in a new referendum. There is also a difference of opinion between, for example, the Scots and the rest of the British. In addition, the British regularly state the historic words of Churchill that “GB is with the EU but not of the EU”.

Conclusion: The Brexit cannot be called a success .

Action Plan against Disinformation

European Commission contribution to the European Council – December 5th 2018

The starting point of this contribution is that free speech is a core value. The citizen must be able to have verifiable information freely. They need this in order to be able to correctly inform themselves about the wide range of political issues and positions. This democratic process is threatened when disinformation mixes things up.

What is the problem?

Disinformation is understood in this document as information that can be verified as being false or misleading. It is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain, or to mislead the public intentionally, and may cause harm to that public.

This is intended to include threats to democratic processes as well as public health, public safety, the environment or public security.

The action plan responds to the European Council’s question of measures to protect the Union’s democratic systems and to defeat disinformation, including the context of the emerging European elections.

Understanding the threat.

An increase of targeted disinformation campaigns against the Union, its institutions and its policies,  is expected, in the run-up to the European elections of 2019. It uses deep-fakes (video manipulation) counterfeits of official documents, bots (automated software), trolls (false profiles on social media) and information theft. Also the traditional, classical, media continue to play a role. The tools and the techniques change quickly, therefore the response must also be done quickly.

Four pillars for ten actions by the Union in response to disinformation.

Actions against disinformation require political decision-taking and cooperation, across Governments (using counter-hybrid threat, cyber security, information and strategic communication communities, data protection, electoral, Legal and media authorities).

The Four pillars are:

  1. To improve the possibilities of the Union’s institutions to detect, analyse and denounce disinformation;
  2. Strengthen collaborative response against disinformation;
  3. Mobilising the private sector to remove disinformation;
  4. Raising awareness and improving social resilience.

Pillar 1: Improving the possibilities of the Union’s institutions to detect, analyse and denounce disinformation.

Action 1: To strengthen a number of Strategic Communication Task forces with specialized staff in data mining and analysis to process the relevant data. It considers also additional media monitoring services for the many language areas Europe has. In addition, we also need to invest in tools to process these data and conduct assessments.

Action 2: The mandates of the strategic communication Task forces for the western Balkan countries and the southern countries will be reviewed, also in order to effectively address misinformation. Member States should further enhance their national capabilities, including in terms of support for the Union with employees.

Pillar 2: Reinforcing collaborative responses against disinformation.

Action 3: A RAS (Rapid Alert System) is developed and put into use. This RAS should work closely with services from the Member States that are reachable 24/7.

Action 4: An increase in communication efforts on the values and policies of the Union, with a view to the forthcoming European elections. The Member States must also make this effort.

Action 5: The Commission and the High Representative, together with the Member States, will strengthen their strategic communications in the Union’s environment. This is done among other by sharing information, sharing in the lessons, raising awareness, proactive reporting and research to strengthen and share information.

Pillar 3: Mobilising the private sector to remove disinformation.

Action 6: The Commission monitors closely and continuously the implementation of the Code of Practice by its signatories. Where necessary, and in the light of the impending elections, the Commission will insist on a swift and effective compliant implementation. To this end an assessment will take place. If this ‘ Code of Practice ‘ proves insufficient, the Commission may propose further actions, including legal proceedings.

Pillar 4: Raising awareness and improving social resilience.

Action 7: In the longer term, targeted campaigns will be organised for the wider public, as well as training for the media and opinion-makers in the Union and its environment. This is aimed at facing the negative effect of disinformation. Efforts will be taken by independent media and quality journalism as well as the investigation of disinformation to provide a comprehensive response.

Action 8: Member States together with the Commission should provide teams of multidisciplinary independent fact-checkers and researchers with specific knowledge of local information, to detect disinformation campaigns on, among other, social networks and digital media.

Action 9: Actions will be taken on the media literacy of the public. Member states should also make rapid use of provisions of the Audio-visual Media Services Directive.

Action 10: Member states must ensure an effective follow-up of the ‘ Elections Package ‘, in particular the ‘ Recommendation ‘. The Commission will monitor this and provide support and advice where appropriate.

 

Resilience strictly speaking – Disaster management: Red Ants, Gray Rhino's, Black Swans, and the relation between BCM, Risk Management (RM) and Crisis Management (CM)

Author: Manu Steens

A first question I ask myself: how do these concepts relate to one another?

The following figure of disasters can offer a solution: this is about known knowns.

This table provides a minimalistic sketch as an answer to the question “What can Disasters be like?

In addition, there are Unknown Knowns such as the Gray Rinho’s.

These are things that come to us, that we know they are there, but that we choose not to see, or forget about them.

Gray Rhino’s are not divisible in well-known or poorly known probability and impact. The impact is great. The probability is great. They are always well-known in terms of probability and impact, and thus fit within the quadrant of Disasters, as follows:

Known Unknowns also exist. These are things we know that are there but we do not know exactlywhat they are. Therefore we can not treat them. These can not be classified with a probability or impact. The consequences may or may not be known. The odds equally. If the consequences are large, but not actively known, and the probability is estimated low, but it suddenly occurs, without any expectation of the event, we speak of a Black Swan. The turkey does not know why the farmer always gives him food, but could have suspected it from a suspicious “Why” question. But the turkey does not know the Christmas party, and can not really assess the probability.

Finally there are Unknown Unknowns. We do not know that we do not know them.

Not only do we not know the probability and the impact, we do not know the event, we do not know the reason, we do not know the consequences. So we can not give a foresight example of this. Unless you look back on the past (Hindsight). Was it right of the priest to save Adolf Hitler from drowning, when he had fallen through the ice as a child?

It is the intention of Resilience management to get to know as many of these four groups as possible and to push them back within the possibilities of the disasters square.

This provides a possible way to frame resilient needs. Where is CM, however? The answer is: everywhere. In all 4 groups, CM actively takes action when a threat manifests itself. Because the known knowns are best known, it is always an advantage to elaborate and prepare RM.

Question 2: what are historically the added values of BCM, RM and CM?

The known added values already known for these three disciplines, are:

  • Compliance with legislation and with clients
  • Protection of the reputation of the organization and the strength of the brand
  • For the time being: competitive advantage
  • Operational improvements
  • Capturing the knowledge and experiences
  • Value protection

Question 3: what are the “new” added values ​​of BCM & RM?

The new added values according to ISO 31000 are:

  • Value creation, and therefore also
  • Included opportunities

Value creation

  • By studying the threats in new and existing projects and processes, these threats can be tackled so that they happen with a greater probability of success and with less costs in the aftercare phase.
  • This also increases the quality of the output and the outcomes, enabling a stronger positioning in the market, which attracts potential customers.
  • This immediately improves the reputation, creating a positive spiral that reflects in a better market value of the organization and generates a positive effect on the stock market.
  • By applying RM in its projects, the government organizations will mutatis mutandis create added value on a social level, which also means more income for the governments and thus create a positive value spiral for society.

Included opportunities

  • When an opportunity presents itself, it can be recorded correctly, in the sense that the risks run by the organization are known and can be tackled in order to optimize its probabilities of success.
  • Because RM has an ‘outlook’, threats, but also opportunities, are better and faster seen.
  • Because there is systematic reporting that is integrated into all layers of the organization and the processes and projects of the business, the policy can assess the opportunities better and faster correctly.

These added values also apply to BCM.

Question 4: what is the most important added value of CM?

What I really want to know is what is expected by the co-workers and by society.

People expect more and more from organizations. They desire certainty in uncertain times. This is what the organization has to do:

  • Deal with the threat
  • Meet the urgency
  • Fight the uncertainty

Deal with the threat

Threats are relative and personal. There are also general threats that affect us all. Perhaps the best example is terror. Although terrorist attacks demand far fewer casualties than fine dust year after year, it affects the people personally through the choice of method, place of occurrence and the timing. They choose these well to maximize fear. This fear touches everyone personally, because there is arbitrariness where when and how one can be a victim. The society does not know, and as a result, everyone of the potential victims address their anger against the perpetrators.

Meet the urgency

Urgency is personal. A potential crisis that affects you personally is usually urgent as long as you are still hoping for opportunities to escape from it.

Fight the uncertainty

The organization mainly does this by making a division into operational management, communication management and strategic management.

With the operational management the organization can show that the problem is being addressed. Counter actions take place and there are claims to be observed. With the strategic management the organization can do sensemaking, and give an understanding to the people of where they stand. The organization can also indicate its actions, explaining the reasons for these actions, to include its liabilities. Also to learn lessons, to avoid the problems in the future. With the communication management, the organization can make itself be heard about the situation, that it is working on the problem, and what the expectations are.

Question 5: And now this: What about Red Ants?

Is this yet another invention to describe risks? No, actually not. It is a disaster type that is naturally present: incidents with small to moderate impact and small to high probability, but with the possibility to grow into a Black Swan or a Gray Rhino very quickly.

Black Swans (Nicolaas Taleb): very small probabilities, very big impacts.
Gray Rhino’s (Michèle Wucker): Very big probabilities, very big impacts
Red Ants: Very big probabilities, smaller impacts.

Often Red Ants are the small incidents without major consequences that are a warning of imperfections in the safety of a system or organization. Usually a large number of red ants precede a gray rhino or a black swan. In addition to the fact that red ants are an annoying phenomenon in the field of security they are a reason to extinguish a lot of fires, and they therefore have a serious warning function. This is: find the root cause and tackle it thoroughly, otherwise sooner or later really big accidents happen.

So every “animal species” is therefore to be taken seriously.

Question 6: And what can you do about it?

Well, let’s present this schematically in the disaster management table:

Conclusion:

  • CM Exercises are the most necessary aspect in disaster management.
  • Risk management includes preventive measures and protective measures (by analogy with the bow-tie analysis method).
  • Uncertainties have the characteristic that probabilities are poorly known but the impacts are better known. Usually because causes are poorly known. As a result, there is a particular need for protective measures.
  • Ambiguities have the characteristic that impacts are poorly known but the probabilities are better known. Usually because consequences are poorly known. As a result, there is a particular need for preventive measures.
  • In the event of unkown probabilities and impacts, the focus must be on the lookout, to estimate unexpected matters in a timely manner and to incorporate measures in the policy of the organization on a continuous basis.